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Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund:
Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and
Prospects for Change
JULIA A. SOLOt
INTRODUCTION
Fear of liability under federal Superfund law may be discouraging use of
former hazardous waste sites even after they have been cleaned up and thus
encouraging industrial development to sprawl onto unpolluted land.'
No city or town benefits when entangled liabilities prevent cleanup and al-
low contamination to worsen. No business or worker advances when lender
fears thwart facility modernization. No local, state or regional economy
gains when sites remain dormant and adjoining neighborhoods suffer.2
T he current version of the Superfund law should be recognized
as detrimental to the economy of distressed urban areas as
well as to our nation's environment. The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),3 a
massive and complex federal environmental law, was passed by the
federal government in 1980 to respond to the problem of hazardous
waste contamination in the United States.4 The focus of CERCLA
legislation, originally, was twofold: to clean up dangerous or poten-
tially dangerous hazardous waste sites and to find parties who
t J.D. Candidate, May 1995, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law;
B.A., 1988, University of Michigan. I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Rob-
ert S. Berger for his endless assistance, advice, and encouragement on this Comment and for
his role in creating a working group on this topic.
1. Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, LIABILITY WK., Apr.
26, 1993.
2. Charles Bartsch & Richard Munson, Restoring Contaminated Industrial Sites, Is-
SUES Sc. & TECH., Spring 1994, at 74, 75.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1992) (commonly referred to as Superfund).
4. 2 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY & LITIGATION
§ 12 (Susan Cooke et al. eds., 1987); see Kathleen M. Martin, Siting on Contaminated
Property: Development and Cleanup through Public/Private Cooperation, NAT. RESOURCES
& EN"T, Winter 1993, at 20, 20; Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. EivrL. L. 1, 7 (1982); see generally S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 126
CONG. REC. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
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could be held accountable to pay for such cleanups. 5 In the process
of seeking to accomplish these goals, however, it has become clear
that Superfund has also had a number of unintended effects," the
most serious being to dissuade industry from redeveloping on for-
mer industrial land.7
The legislation imposes extremely broad liability, intended
presumably to ensure that polluters pay.' Under the scheme, how-
ever, any party who becomes associated with a piece of contami-
nated property can, essentially, be deemed fully liable for the cost
of cleanup, regardless of that party's connection with the contami-
nation.' As a result, developers and investors are reluctant to ac-
quire property which is likely to be contaminated.10
All former industrial property is perceived to have a high risk
of contamination, and thus is avoided regularly by investors. The
properties, which then sit idle and abandoned, usually in low-in-
come urban neighborhoods, have come to be known as
brownfields. 1" The loss of new business development has exacer-
bated economic hardship in these areas. Former industrial urban
5. H.R. REP. No. 253 (III), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985); Stephen M. Feldman, Com-
ment, CERCLA Liability, Where It Is and Where It Should Not Be Going: The Possibility
of Liability Release for Environmentally Beneficial Land Transfers, 23 ENvm. L. 295, 298
(1993); Walter Mugden, Deputy Regional Council, Office of Regional Council, Region 2,
EPA, Address at University of Buffalo School of Law (Oct. 1993); see also Elizabeth F.
Mason, Comment, Contribution, Contribution Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under
CERCLA: Following Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. EwrrL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 74 (1991).
6. See Barry Kellman, Symposium on the Seventh Circuit as a Commercial Court:
The Seventh Circuit on Environmental Regulation of Business, 65 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 757,
760 n.9 (arguing that the agencies authorized to promulgate environmental statutes must
bear in mind that the decisions they make not only have short-term environmental effects,
but "may also profoundly affect the future in foreseeable and unforeseeable ways.").
7. Bartsch & Munson, supra note 2 (arguing that "[p]erhaps the greatest barrier to
industrial site reuse ... is the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act-commonly known as Superfund").
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); Grad, supra note 4.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals
Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 592 (1993); Grad,
supra note 4.
10. Statement of Timothy Fields, Jr., Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, at the Ple-
nary Session on "Recycling Inner City Properties" before The United States Conference of
Mayors (June 13, 1994) [hereinafter Conference of Mayors]; Bartsch & Munson, supra note
2, at 74.
11. Conference of Mayors, supra note 10; Bartsch & Munson, supra note 2; Reed Ru-
binstein & Mary Field, Clean Up Superfund or Write Off Urban Redevelopment, CONN. L.
Tam., May 3, 1993, at 20; Viki Reath, Think Tank Suggests Superfund Reforms, ENv'T
WK., Jan. 20, 1994, § 20 (citing study by the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis); Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Con-
gress Told, supra note 1, § 17.
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centers are now characterized by falling tax bases, increased job-
lessness, and a large number of abandoned properties.
12
Subsequent to Superfund's passage, developers have opted for
the safer solution and built a majority of new industries and enter-
prises on pristine land located in the suburbs or in the country-
side.13 Rural and suburban sites, often referred to as greenfields,
are less likely to have been previously used for industrial purposes
and, therefore, have a lower probability of containing hazardous
waste. Thus, developers are spared the danger of incurring liability
for somebody else's waste.
The irony of Superfund is that it has created incentives to
spread contamination. While the purpose behind the legislation
was to clean up hazardous waste and protect the environment, it
has resulted in contaminated properties sitting idle while more
green land is developed. The contaminated properties pose a risk
to urban residents and the new jobs are not accessible to those who
need them the most.'4
The basic barriers to urban economic redevelopment, which
stem from Superfund legislation, include:
(a) the risk of liability for "innocent"15 prospective purchasers
of industrial property;'6
(b) the enormous economic costs associated with site assess-
12. Conference of Mayors, supra note 10, at 5; see CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLANNING
COMM'N, BROWNFIELDS REUSE STRATEGIES 25 (1993) [hereinafter CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN.
COMM'N]; Summaries of Clinton Administration Proposal for Superfund Reform, Released
by E.P.A. [Feb. 3, 1994] Toxics Law Rep. (BNA) at 1024 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Clinton
Proposal]; BRIAN HILL & JOANNE DENWORTH, REPORT ON REUSE OF INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUND-
TABLE 5 (Pennsylvania Environmental Council 1993) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUND-
TABLE]; Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1; Ru-
binstein & Field, supra note 11.
With this decline also comes, inevitably, a greater need for services, poorer quality
housing, poorly funded school systems, and higher crime rates. See generally James T.
O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-
Fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 45-46, 54 (1994).
13. John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REv.
766-67, 807-13 (1990); Bradford C. Mank, Article: The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and
Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps, Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the
Monster?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 240 (1991); Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11.
14. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 43, 47-48.
15. The term "innocent" conjures up an image that all previous owners and PRPs are
"guilty." This is not, necessarily, an accurate image or label, due to the fact that Superfund
liability is imposed on parties regardless of whether their waste handling procedures were
legal and concerned with protection of public health.
The term "innocent" for purposes of this discussion merely means that the party or
parties had no responsibility for, and no economic connection with, the handling, produc-
tion, use, storage, or disposal of the hazardous contamination on the property.
16. Feldman, supra note 5, at 298; Martin, supra note 4, at 20.
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ment and cleanup and thus with liability;17
(c) a lack of clearly defined cleanup standards; 8 and
(d) a lack of available public funding to assist with cleanup
and assessment (particularly for small businesses)."
Legal solutions must be offered to overcome the impediments to
redeveloping former industrial sites. Local governments would
then be likely to follow with similar local redevelopment
initiatives.2
17. See John J. Byrne & Thomas J. Greco, Superfund Reform Needed to Keep Credit
Flowing, AM. BANKER, Mar. 22, 1994, at 17 (stating that environmental impact studies alone
cost between $500 and $2500); Mank, supra note 13, at 256.
18. Douglas Wolf & Jacqueline M. Warren, How Clean Is Clean?, 30 ENV'T 3 (1988).
19. Robert S. Berger et. al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the
Challenge of Brownfields Redevelopment, BUFF. J. ENVTL. L. (forthcoming Spring 1995).
20. A number of state governments have already passed laws to help curb some of the
harsh effects of the environmental laws and to help promote urban redevelopment. See
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act, MAss.
GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 3A (1993); Michigan Environmental Response Act, MIcH. CoMP. LAWS
§ 299.614 (1992); Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN. STAT.
§§ 115B.01-.24 (1993); Minnesota Contamination Cleanup Grants, MINN. STAT.
§§ 116J.551-.557 (1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.01-.99 (Baldwin 1994).
Creative pending legislation exists on a wider scale. See Colorado Voluntary Cleanup
and Redevelopment Act, H.R. 1299, Colo. 59th Gen. Assembly, 2d Regular Sess. (1994) (en-
acted); H.R. 4720, Mich. 87th Leg., Regular Sess. (1993) (provides economic redevelopment
grants); H.R. 4058, Mich. 87th Leg., Regular Sess. (1993); S. 659, Mich. 87th Leg., Regular
Sess. (1993) (targets existing infrastructure and promotes cleanups); S. 7787, N.Y. 215th
Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1994) (enacting voluntary remediation act); Pennsylvania Indus-
trial Reuse Act, H.R. 1895, Pa. 176th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1993); Pennsylvania
Industrial and Commercial Land Recycling Law, H.R. 2065, Pa. 176th Gen. Assembly, Reg-
ular Sess. (1993); S. 972, Pa. 178th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1993); Wisconsin Land
Recycling Act, S. 462, Wis. 91st Leg., Regular Sess. (1993).
County and municipal leaders have had regional meetings and conferences on this spe-
cific topic, the crisis it is causing in their communities and how to best promote redevelop-
ment of urban areas rather than industrialization of suburban areas. See CUYAHOGA COUNTY
PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12; Erie County Div. of Envtl. Compliance Servs., Erie County
Dep't of Env't & Planning, Draft: Prioritizing Erie County Hazardous Waste Sites for
Remediation Based on Future Use Potential, Dec. 1992 (on file with author); INDUSTIAL
SITES ROUNDTABLE, supra note 12.
At the local levels, municipalities have offered incentives to promote redevelopment and
help instigate cleanup. Such incentives include tax incremental financing in Wichita, Kan-
sas; tax increment financing and low-interest city loans in Minneapolis, Minnesota; fun-
draising drives for industrial rejuvenation and tax increment financing in Davenport, Iowa.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12, at 54.
State and local laws, however, cannot override federal law, and sites that contain suffi-
cient contamination, which have been targeted by the federal government will still be dealt
with under CERCLA. The federal government, under the Clinton Administration, is now
also acknowledging the stagnated redevelopment and cleanup of industrial and formerly in-
dustrial sites and has proposed amendments to address it in its 1994 proposal to Congress
for Superfund reauthorization. See H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Clinton Propo-
sal, supra note 12.
THE ROLE OF SUPERFUND
The issue of community participation raised time and time
again in the area of environmental justice is relevant in the area of
brownfield redevelopment.21 While environmental justice advocates
focus on the history of siting toxic industries in low-income, minor-
ity areas, and the need to empower neighborhoods to demand safer
living conditions, the brownfield problem has also contributed sig-
nificantly to urban blight. The short-sightedness of current
Superfund legislation has contributed to the abandonment of ur-
ban toxic lands rather than creating an incentive to improve envi-
ronmental conditions, particularly on former commercial and in-
dustrial urban property.
2
If the government is to play a role in sparking redevelopment
of brownfield sites, community participation will be a necessary
component. The communities have paid the price for a governmen-
tal policy which has discouraged development in urban areas.
Neighborhoods are often turned into ghost towns, and jobs are fre-
quently taken away from these communities. These same commu-
nities should not be required to sit back while the government
throws money at the problem simply to encourage redevelopment
without any sense of its impact on individuals. Residents from
within a community are best equipped to determine what type of
developments are desirable and sustainable. These same communi-
ties will directly pay the price of any mistakes that are made. Any
proposed incentive schemes should aim to make redevelopment ac-
cessible to all members of society and not exclusively to those with
the most money. If redevelopment schemes are dependent upon
community authorization and are accessible to those of all eco-
nomic means, the success of redevelopment efforts will inevitably
be greater.
21. The environmental justice movement has focused on the history of zoning hazard-
ous waste facilities and highly polluting industries in predominantly poor and minority
neighborhoods. Such siting decisions were made for numerous reasons, but predominantly
because the low income neighborhoods tended to have less political power, and therefore,
less say over their environmental conditions. Lives were sacrificed for economic reasons, and
the lives were generally those of the poor, minorities, women, and children. For a compre-
hensive discussion of the issues surrounding the environmental justice movement, see Vicki
Been, What's Fairness Got to do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993).
The topic of this Comment, however, is meant to address additional unfairness to urban
residents and neighborhoods. Legislation, though meant to create improved environmental
conditions, has been shortsighted and has instead contributed to abandoned wastelands in
these same urban areas. The cost of redevelopment on these sites is prohibitive, preventing
development, either from within the community or from outside. In light of the develop-
ment situation, jobs are becoming more and more scarce, as well as farther away from the
cities. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 12.
22. For a lengthier discussion of abandonment of the urban core, see infra part II.
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To illustrate the importance of a change in environmental laws
both in order to preserve the environment and to promote urban
industrial redevelopment, this Comment will focus on six major ar-
eas: (1) CERCLA's liability scheme; (2) CERCLA's effects on ur-
ban economic development; (3) the effects of economic develop-
ment on the future of urban economies and urban populations; (4)
CERCLA's environmental impact; (5) the need for change; and (6)
proposed alternatives to the CERCLA liability scheme and the
pros and cons of such alternatives.
I. CERCLA's LIABILITY SCHEME
CERCLA was passed by Congress in 1980 primarily as a re-
sponse to the environmental (and political) catastrophe at Love
Canal.23 Environmental bills relating to the issue of hazardous
23. Charles W. Powers, Resources for Responsible Management, Property and Land
Use as the Key to Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites, in CLEAN SITES 87 (Working Paper
on Super Fund Reform, prepared for Clean Sites' Board of Directors, 1992); MARTIN LINSKY
ET AL., HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING-SIX CASE STUDIES 27, 52 (1986);
Grad, supra note 4, at 7-8.
The Love Canal crisis became well known in 1979. In the 1940s and 1950s, Niagara
Falls, New York was home to a number of chemical manufacturing plants including Hooker
Chemical. Hooker Chemical buried chemical waste on a large strip of land which had once
been Love Canal. The waste burial was done by permit and according to the disposal meth-
ods known at the time. In the 1950s, the school board of Niagara Falls, New York acquired
the property for one dollar. In the property deed, Hooker Chemical notified the school dis-
trict of the chemical waste buried on the land and disclaimed any liability associated with
damage, personal or property, caused as a result of the chemicals. Eventually, an elementary
school was built over the canal site, and homes and neighborhoods sprung up all around.
Hooker Chemical wrote a letter to the school board indicating its disapproval of the use of
the property for a school.
In the early 1970s, residents became increasingly aware that some of the chemicals were
leaking into their basements and bubbling up through the ground into the schoolyard and
their backyards. The chemicals were very toxic, some of them containing dioxins. The press
began to cover the story fairly regularly beginning in 1976. Also, state and local officials
began to conduct investigations of the leaking substances. By 1978 it was commonly under-
stood that the substances posed a danger and some families were advised by federal envi-
ronmental officials to stay out of their basements. The homes had basically lost all value, as
no one could find buyers given the presence and perceived danger of toxic waste. Soon,
governmental officials began to take blood samples of the residents, in an attempt to deter-
mine more precisely what type of danger the chemicals posed to the residents. The commu-
nity residents became terribly alarmed and wanted to move their families out of the neigh-
borhood at once. The government failed to respond by offering assistance to the residents,
and most residents were financially unable to relocate without finding purchasers for their
now valueless properties.
Frustrated by government's unwillingness to assist them, and perceiving that the gov-
ernment was covering up many of its findings, the local residents used the media as their
voice. Eventually, due to the organization and persistence of the residents and the political
suicide associated with non-action, some of the residents' homes were purchased. The gov-
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waste had been discussed in Congress for at least three years prior
to its passage. 24 Superfund, however, was a hastily constructed
bill.25 It may have passed primarily as a public policy effort to
show the country that the government was concerned with the pro-
tection of "public health [,] welfare [and] the environment" from
hazardous wastes which are later found to have leaked.26
Superfund legislation has had significant effects on all prop-
erty transactions in the United States.27 The list of hazardous con-
taminants is extremely large, and includes a wide array of com-
monly used chemicals.28 Sites can include "virtually any place at
ernment concluded that much of the problem stemmed from the lack of designated govern-
mental funding for such a situation.
One of the major results of the Love Canal crisis was a public perception that the gov-
ernment was not willing to take action to deal with the health and property hazards associ-
ated with leaking hazardous wastes. The modest-income residents received a particularly
sympathetic perception by the general public. Much of this was due to the large amount of
publicity the residents were able to gain, the perception of serious health risks to the resi-
dents, and governmental inability or unwillingness to provide financial assistance to resi-
dents in order to help them relocate. Toward the end of this series of events, Superfund
legislation was passed by Congress. ADELINE LEviNE, LoVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND
PEOPLE 7-26 (1982); Judith Miller, Byline, N.Y. TIMs, Apr. 29, 1979, at 36; see Comment,
An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a Common Law Criminal,
39 AM. U. L. REv. 311, 316 n.26 (1990); see also MICHAEL BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE
POISONING OF AMERICA BY Toxic CHEMICALS 303-19 (1979).
24. See 2 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY, & LITIGA-
TION, supra note 4, §§ 12.02[1]-.04[1][b]; Grad, supra note 4.
25. See 2 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY, & LrrIGA-
TION, supra note 4, § 12.04(1)(a); LINSKY ET A., supra note 23, at 27, 52; Grad, supra note 4;
Powers, supra note 23, at 87.
26. Exec. Order No. 12,580(4)(d)(1), 40 C.F.R. § 300.2 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a) (1992).
27. Thaddeus Bereday, Contractual Transfers of Liability Under CERCLA Section
107(E)(1): For Enforcement of Private Risk Allocations in Real Property Transactions, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161 (1992); Charles D. Crealese, A Review of Environmental Site
Assessment Guidance Desperately Seeking Standards, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 6, 1993,
at 8.
28. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1994), designates hazardous substances as those desig-
nated by the EPA or those found in any of four other environmental laws. Section 9601(14)
states:
The term 'hazardous substance' means (A) any substance designated pursuant to
section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution,
or substance designated [hazardous waste] pursuant to section 9602 of this title,
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pur-
suant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act... (D) any toxic pollutant
listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act ... and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken
action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum,
including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
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which hazardous wastes have been dumped, or otherwise disposed
of" including roadsides, dragstrips, and real estate subdivisions.2"
Potentially contaminated property, therefore, includes property
with various and unexpected former uses, such as former manufac-
turing buildings, plants, mills, gas stations, and even dry cleaners.3 0
The EPA's working definition of brownfield is "a previous indus-
trial site which is left undeveloped due to the uncertainty of liabil-
ity and cleanup costs."'31 For purposes of discussion in this Com-
ment, that definition will be expanded to include both former
industrial and commercial sites, since each can lead to a risk of
contamination.
The liability scheme under Superfund is very broad32 and has
been a source of major controversy since the legislation's initial
passage in 1980.33 Numerous parties may be held liable for the full
this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas . . . or synthetic gas
usable for fuel, (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
Id. CERCLA's definition of hazardous waste includes over 700 substances, many of
which are ordinary household substances. B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir.
1992).
29. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A) (1994); see New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n.15 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Nepacco, 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895
(E.D.N.C. 1985); see also U.S. v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 185 (W.D. Mo.
1985); New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United
States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz. 1984).
30. See Clinton Proposal, supra note 12, at 1024; INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUNDTABLE, supra
note 12, at 2; CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12, at 2, 53; see generally MAK-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS WORK FOR NEW YORK'S ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION COMMITrEE LEGISLATIVE COM-
MISSION ON Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES, LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REVIEW COMMISSION 37 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter NYS HEARING REPORT].
31. Conference of Mayors, supra note 10.
32. Superfund's liability scheme has been interpreted as strict, joint, several, retroac-
tive, and perpetual. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers, 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1990). Liability applies to past owners as
well as current owners of property, regardless of which party was responsible for the con-
tamination. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1992). Fault is not considered as a factor in determin-
ing liability. See Oswald, supra note 9, at 590.
33. See Cheryl Kessler Clark, Due Process and the 'Environmental Lien: The Need for
Legislative Reform, 20 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 203, 203-04 (1993) (discussing broad power
of the EPA to assign liability and place liens on property without allowing for judicial re-
view and possible due process violations of such procedure); Mason, supra note 5, at 76
(advocating use of the "fair share" approach in determining liability of potentially responsi-
ble parties in CERCLA actions); Mank, supra note 13, at 293; Bereday, supra note 27, at
169 (arguing that "the 'polluters pay' rationale is not always justified because strict liability
imposes costs on 'innocent' purchasers and other owners irrespective of who is in fact re-
sponsible."); GRIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, CLEANING Up HAZARDOUS WASTE: Is
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cost of cleaning any hazardous waste release associated with a
piece of property. Potentially responsible parties (PRP's) include,
among others, the party which owned the land at the time of its
initial exposure to contamination and the current owner or opera-
tor of the property.3 4 Inclusion of "present owners" in the scheme
imposes liability on parties which may have no responsibility for
the hazardous waste. The present owner of property may well have
purchased it long after the waste was disposed or the contamina-
tion leaked onto the property. The liability scheme under CER-
CLA is joint, strict, and several.3 5 The liability scheme, though not
THERE A BETTER WAY, at xvi-xvii (1993) (proposing abolition of retroactive liability).
Interestingly, even Senators present at the time of the bill's passage expressed concern
about the retroactive nature of the liability structure and the negative effects which would
result to industry, small businesses and the economy. Grad, supra note 4, at 14; S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 108-15 (1980).
34. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1992), reads:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a
vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged with
a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity, and containing
such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any haz-
ardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C)
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from such a
release; and (D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9404(i) of this title.
Id.; see also Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991); Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d at 1317 (11th Cir. 1990).
35. Grad, supra note 4; see, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042
(2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y.
1988).
The liability scheme under CERCLA is also retroactive. Liability is and has been im-
posed on parties who disposed of contamination years prior to the passage of Superfund.
This is so regardless of whether they used disposal methods which were legal and authorized
at the time. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Hooker Chem. &
Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. at 556-57; United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064,
1069-73 (D. Colo. 1985).
There soon may be a change in the retroactive liability aspect of Superfund. On March
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specifically set forth in the statute, has been interpreted by many
courts over the past fifteen years.36 The strict liability component
allows liability to be assessed in the absence of fault.3 7 Many pro-
spective purchasers of property are extremely leery, lest they be-
come entangled in the trapping web of a no-fault standard.38
Why strict liability? Strict liability has historically been im-
posed on industries engaged in ultra-hazardous activities.39 Strict
liability standards are implemented in an attempt to "promote
fairness, economic efficiency, risk-spreading, and deterrence [to all
parties engaged in the ultra-hazardous activity.] '40 The strict lia-
bility component of CERCLA was intended to spread risks and
costs between all parties associated with the hazardous waste in-
dustry and to simplify the government's ability to assess liability
and receive money.41 The liability scheme may be equitable with
21, 1994, Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) and Rep. Bill Seliff (R-N.H.) "announced [that]
they planned to introduce superfund legislation that would absolve potentially responsible
parties of lability for activities conducted prior to 1980." Elimination of Retroactive Liabil-
ity Proposed by Republicans in Reform Bill, MGMT. BRIEFING, Mar. 22, 1994.
36. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1418 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 167
n.11; Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042; Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. at
546; Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp, 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986); see also Oswald, supra note 9,
at 580 ("In fleshing out CERCLA's sparse and inadequate language, the courts, quite under-
standably, have often been sidetracked by the deficiencies of the Act's specific provisions
... [n]owhere is this problem more readily apparent than in cases addressing individual
liability . . ").
37. See Oswald, supra note 9, at 590.
38. The Innocent Landowner Defense, passed in 1986 as part of the Superfund Amend-
ment and Reauthorization Act (SARA), was an attempt by the federal government to allevi-
ate this trap for landowners who purchased property subsequent to contamination and in no
way contributed to the condition of the site. Unfortunately, due to the very narrow con-
struction of the defense, it has not served to alleviate uncertainty about liability and has not
been effectively utilized by many who would, by most standards, be considered innocent.
The Innocent Landowner Defense can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1992). For a de-
tailed discussion of the Innocent Landowner Defense to liability, see supra notes 46-53 and
accompanying text.
39. "One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has
exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1)
(1977) (emphasis added).
40. Oswald, supra note 9, at 592.
41. However, Superfund cleanups and lawsuits tend to move slowly, possibly because of
the efficiency or lack thereof of large federal bureaucratic agencies, and partially because of
the extent to which PRP's challenge their liability in court. These challenges often place
great delays on cleanups. Transaction costs, including court fees between insurers, PRP's
and the government, also greatly increase the cost of cleanup. See KATHERINE N. PROBST &
PAUL R. PORTNEY, ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY
OPTIONS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 12 (1992).
The severity of the liability scheme does, arguably, create an incentive to financially
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respect to PRP's engaged in an "abnormally dangerous activity. 42
The strict liability rationale43 is wholly unfair, however, when it is
used to impose liability on prospective purchasers or new owners
who may never have participated in the "abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity. '44 The all-inclusive aspect of Superfund's strict liability
component actually serves to deter redevelopment of potentially
contaminated sites by making these sites unmarketable. s
In an attempt to increase the fairness of the statute and re-
duce the instances where liability would be imposed on parties who
had no connection whatsoever with hazardous waste, in 1986 Con-
gress passed the Innocent Landowner Defense to Liability as part
of the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act, commonly
referred to as SARA.46 The Innocent Landowner Defense is a de-
fense to CERCLA liability for landowners who purchased land
subsequent to its contamination and who did not contribute in any
way to its current state.47 The Innocent Landowner Defense ap-
plies only to owners who "unknowingly acquired contaminated
property . . .and who undertook all appropriate inquiry at the
time of acquisition. '48 The "appropriate inquiry" is generally con-
secure responsible parties to cooperate with one another. See Olin Corp. v. Consolidated
Aluminum Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1133, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("CERCLA provides an incentive
for PRP's to voluntarily remediate hazards, but, prospectively it also provides a deterrent to
the unsafe release of hazardous materials."); Andrew Ratzkin, Superfund is up to Environ-
mental Task, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 22, 1993, at 19 (noting that "CERCLA has
been a wild success in grabbing corporate America by the lapels and enlisting its considera-
ble resources in the remediation of environmental hazards" and, that "CERCLA effects self-
policing and private-party cleanup that doesn't cost the government a dime").
Additionally, because a persuasive argument could be made that each of the four poten-
tial classes of defendants profited from the production or handling of the waste, the scheme
is, in some way, equitable.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1)-(2) (1977) (explaining rationale behind
strict liability).
43. The rationale is based on fairness, equity, deterrence, and risk distribution. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977); Oswald, supra note 9, at 590.
44. Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11, at 20; see generally Superfund Liability May
Add To Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1; see Ellman v. Woo, No. 90-0718, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18750, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1991).
45. See William Tucker, Industry Goes Where the Grass is Greener: Superfund
Sparks Flight to Suburban Locations, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at A9; Elliot P. Laws,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste Management and Emergency Response, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Address at the Conference of the National Council for
Urban Economic Development on Environmental Redevelopment (Sept. 26, 1994); Confer-
ence of Mayors, supra note 10.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
47. Id.
48. 2 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY & LITIGATION,
supra note 4, § 12.05(2), at 12-17 (emphasis added).
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sidered to be an environmental audit at the time of purchase. 4
Most lenders require that an environmental audit be conducted on
the property prior to approval of financingY° If an environmental
audit did, in fact, reveal some existing contamination, a purchaser
is considered to be on notice and would not be protected under the
Innocent Landowner Defense.5 1 Purchasers who neglect to conduct
an audit will not have met the statutory requirement of "appropri-
ate inquiry" and will also remain unprotected by the Innocent
Landowner Defense.2
Not surprisingly, the Innocent Landowner Defense has been
strictly interpreted by the courts, and purchasers of property
would be advised to seek clean sites rather than rely on their "in-
nocence" as a defense to liability under CERCLA.5 3 The word "in-
nocent" as used in the Innocent Landowner Defense has a meaning
more closely akin to ignorance, or unawareness than actual inno-
cence. If a prospective purchaser or new owner of contaminated
property had nothing to do with the state or condition of the prop-
erty, no worthwhile policy objective is fulfilled by refusing to ex-
empt that individual from liability. The concept of "innocence"
should be enlarged to encompass those who are truly innocent of
polluting. Only by exempting a larger class of innocent landowners
will contaminated property have a chance of being cleaned and
redeveloped. The current scheme, whereby polluters and non-pol-
luters alike are included under Superfund's strict liability struc-
ture, is stagnating economic redevelopment and recovery in former
industrial urban areas.
II. CERCLA's EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CERCLA has a great effect on economic development and
planning. The consequences of CERCLA have to be considered in
business decisions. To illustrate this point, consider the following
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1992).
50. Gary Hector, A New Reason You Can't Get a Loan, FORTUNE, Sept. 21, 1992, at
107. The audit requirement by lenders stems from the desire to avoid PRP status and the
subsequent reluctance to invest in contaminated properties. Though CERCLA itself appears
to give liability exemptions to lenders, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a) (1992), there have been
many instances in which the courts have held lenders liable for contamination on property
that they held as collateral or foreclosed upon. See, Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
51. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Chem-Dye Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)
(1992).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1992).
53. See Feldman, supra note 5.
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example. A small business owner in Detroit, Michigan was inter-
ested in enlarging his electrical contracting business by expanding
his existing building onto a neighboring parking lot.5 4 The business
owner was not, nor had he ever been, an owner of the parking lot.55
His Detroit bank refused him the loan necessary for the expansion
fearing liability stemming from traces of oil, antifreeze, and fuel
that had dripped onto the lot over the years.5 6 Instead of ex-
panding in the city as intended, the owner moved his entire busi-
ness to an area of undeveloped land sixty miles north of Detroit.5 7
With this decision, he took ten jobs away from urban workers .5
A similar, yet more severe, situation occurred in Chicago, Illi-
nois. A metal-stamping firm, attempting to expand in the city,
could not find a large enough area within the city which was not
plagued with environmental problems.59 As a result, that industry
also fled to a suburban area, and in the move, forty urban jobs
were lost.60
Finally, a most notable anecdote comes from Cleveland. A
newspaper owner, in his quest to construct a new production plant,
looked at several downtown industrial properties. He ultimately
chose an abandoned rail yard on the shores of Lake Erie. "The
property had excellent transportation access and was perfect for
[his] needs."61 The Company spent $60,000 on its environmental
assessment, only to find that the costs of cleanup would be prohib-
itive.2 Instead, the newspaper chose a suburban location due to its
"lack of . . .environmental liability. ' 63 "The new plant, with its
400 jobs [was] scheduled to open in 1994. ''A4
These anecdotes merely skim the surface of instances in which
urban workers have lost jobs due to legitimate fears by business
owners of becoming liable for contamination on urban land. It is
interesting to note that in each of these cases, the land that the
business owners sought to acquire was not "seriously" contami-
54. This story is taken in its entirety from Keith Schneider, Rules Easing for Urban
Toxic Cleanups, N.Y. TnmEs, Sept. 20 1993, at A12.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Schneider, supra note 54.
59. This story is taken from Richard M. Daley, Wastelands Transformed, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1994, at A15.
60. Id.
61. Tucker, supra note 45, at A9.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
1995]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
nated.6 5 The properties were not previously used as hazardous
waste disposal facilities, nor were they scheduled for cleanup under
the Superfund program or a state cleanup program. Regardless of
the level of contamination, however, the simple knowledge that
some level of contamination existed on the properties and the pro-
hibitive cost of dealing with such contamination were enough to
force the business owners outside of urban areas, despite their
desires to remain.
In the first two examples, the business owners actually moved
their businesses, rather than simply expand at their existing loca-
tions.68 There can be little doubt that the business owners incurred
significant costs in connection with the moves. The drastic deci-
sions to move an entire business out of town rather than acquire a
lot to build an addition gives some insight into both the costs asso-
ciated with even low-level contamination as well as the public per-
.ception about the severity of the Superfund liability laws.
Urban industrial property, including property with relatively
small amounts of contamination, can often be acquired at a low
price.67 This may be true partially because there is virtually no
market for it.65 The risk of potential liability associated with be-
coming a "current owner" of contaminated property incurs a cost
which far outweighs the initial savings.69 The costs of cleaning up a
contaminated piece of property can be prohibitive.7 0 In many
cases, the cost of liability is found to "far exceed the value of the
property in an environmentally clean condition."' 71 Such a proposi-
65. My reference to serious contamination is a site that has been identified on the Na-
tional Priorities List (NPL). The NPL, taking "into consideration the limited resources
which exist to combat the problem of hazardous waste sites [lists] ...those sites which
pose the greatest threat to human health or the environment." Ragna Henrichs,
Superfund's NPL: The Listing Process, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 717, 717 (1989). Other known
contaminated sites may be listed by state registries and scheduled for investigation under
state superfund statutes. It was estimated that in 1989, the NPL listed slightly more than
1,200 sites of the over "30,000 known or suspected sites ...nationwide." Id. at 717-18
(These figures do not include the numerous sites which are unknown to contain hazards).
66. Daley, supra note 59; Schneider, supra note 54.
67. Tucker, supra note 45 ("Normally, industrial property is worth $50,000 an acre, but
because of the cleanup costs associated with this site [1.8 acres], we've been trying to unload
it for $3,000 total." (quoting Del Dettmann, a real estate specialist in the city of Milwaukee,
speaking about 1.8 acres of prime commercial real estate that the city acquired through tax
delinquency when its industrial owner went bankrupt)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Reed Hayward & Bill Russell, Cleaning Up the Dirt. . .Is Your Plant Next;
Environmental Regulations, PLANT ENG'G, Aug. 12, 1993, at 80; Tucker, supra note 45, at
A9 (quoting Bill Barnard, public affairs director of the Cleveland Plain Dealer).
71. Bonnie H. Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Pol-
luters?, 19 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 885, 885 (1992).
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tion leads to the conclusion that developers would not accept the
property even if it were given to them.
The difficulty of redeveloping urban industrial property also
stems from the difficulty in obtaining loans and insurance. 72 Under
CERCLA, all potential environmental problems, even minor
problems, diminish the resale value of the land."3 Banks are, un-
derstandably, reluctant to make loans upon which the collateral
might prove worthless.74 Additionally, "if the institution has to
foreclose, it could face cleanup costs many times the value of the
loan. ' 75 "A 1990 poll of the ABA's Community Bankers Council
found that .... 62.5% of [their] .. .members declined potential
borrowers based on the possibility of environmental liability. ' 76
Lenders have been held to be financially liable for cleanup costs,
though lender liability is somewhat tenuous as designated by the
statute.7 7 The statutory language appears to offer a liability ex-
emption to creditors; however, there has been a great deal of con-
troversy over what factors determine a creditors liability for con-
taminated property.7s
The controversy predominantly surrounds the issues of fore-
closure and management. Courts have interpreted the statutory
language to mean that, while creditors will not be held liable for
waste contamination of their debtors, they "will be [held] liable if
[their] involvement with the management of the facility is suffi-
72. Mank, supra note 13, at 247-48; see generally Insurance Coverage for Cercla
Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Cleaning Up Waste In the Legal
Environment, 68 NOTRE DAhiE L. REV. 549 (1993).
73. According to Kathleen M. Martin, as contamination increases, value decreases, so
that slightly contaminated land has a somewhat decreased value, and highly contaminated
land may have a negative value if the cost of remediation exceeds the cost of the property in
a clean condition. Martin, supra note 4. For land in which the degree of contamination and
the cost of cleanup are uncertain, it is difficult to estimate the degree of discrepancy be-
tween present value and pre-contamination valuation.
74. Colleen Johnson, Bankers Beware of Pollution Liability: Expert, Bus. INs., Feb. 11,
1991, at 15; see Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
75. Byrne & Greco, supra note 17, at 17.
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1992). Under CERCLA, the term "owner or operator...
does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility." Id.; see Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1100; United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Nepaco, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986).
78. A great deal of the controversy surrounds the distinction between a creditor with an
"indicia of ownership" versus a creditor with "actual ownership" with respect to managing
the affairs of a debtor after foreclosure. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1100; Fleet Factors Corp.,
901 F.2d 1550; Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 578-80.
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ciently broad to support the inference that [they] could affect haz-
ardous waste disposal decisions if [they] so chose. '79 This ex-
panded interpretation has caused considerable concern to
lenders.s0 As a result, lenders have substantially altered their lend-
ing practices"' and significantly less money is available to busi-
nesses wishing to develop on industrial land. 2
Insurers, as well, often have been forced to pay for environ-
mental cleanups if their policy holders are found to have been po-
tentially responsible parties. 3 Major cleanups can cost millions of
dollars and failure to comply with payment and cleanup schedules
can result in fines of up to $25,000 per day.84 "Superfund could
pose [a threat] to insurer solvency" and "exposure could bankrupt
every major liability insurer in the country."' Recently, many in-
surance companies have redrafted their policies to restrict the
amount of coverage available for environmental cleanup." Though
special environmental policies are available specifically to protect
against future discovery of property contamination, these policies
tend to be prohibitively expensive.8 7 "A $1 million, no frill [envi-
ronmental remediation insurance] policy . . . would cost approxi-
mately $10,000."1
Such costs put great strain on new industries and would likely
79. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1101 (quoting from United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901
F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990)).
80. Id. at 1103; see also Byrne & Greco, supra note 17, at 17.
81. Johnson, supra note 74, at 15. Intervenor American Bankers Association has
pointed to a survey
indicating that lenders curtailed loans made to certain classes of borrowers or se-
cured by some types of properties in order to avoid the virtually unlimited liabil-
ity risk associated with collateral property that may be contaminated. Some lend-
ers ... even chose to abandon collateral properties rather than foreclosing on
them for fear of post-foreclosure liability.
Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104-05.
82. Byrne & Greco, supra note 17, at 17; see generally Charlotte A. Biblow, Comment:
Fiduciaries Are Waiting for Relief From Exposure on Environmental Issues, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 22, 1994, at 17.
83. Insurance Coverage for CERCLA Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability
Policies: Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste in the Legal Environment, supra note 72, at 553-
54; Colleen Johnson, Insurer Seeks Superfund Reforms, Bus. rNs., Feb. 18, 1991, at 82.
84. Hayward & Russell, supra note 70, at 80.
85. Johnson, supra note 83, at 82 (referring to the 1991 Harold H. Hines Jr. Memorial
Symposium in Chicago, co-sponsored by the Insurance School of Chicago and the Chicago
and Northeastern Illinois Chapters of the Risk & Insurance Management Society Inc.).
86. Michael D. Zarin, Who Pays to Clean Up the Property? Managing the Risks With
Insurance, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1994, at S1.
87. Id. at S9.
88. Id.
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drive investors to avoid formerly industrialized areas."9 Industry
gains more favorable finance and insurance rates by choosing clean
and previously unused landY0 Therefore, much urban property,
which would normally have been considered prime real estate and
which is connected to existing infrastructure, is passed over by de-
veloping businesses for lands in the countryside.9'
III. URBAN ECONOMIC IMPACT
Urban centers across the country are facing barriers in at-
tempts to increase their tax bases and create jobs by attracting in-
dustry and promoting internal business expansion.2 Many for-
merly industrial cities have watched their once strong
manufacturing bases drastically decline in the past decades.9 3 Un-
employment rates have increased, particularly in urban areas.
Studies conclude that "the unemployed population significantly
outweighs the number of job openings available at any point in
time., 94
Superfund's liability scheme has certainly not caused this de-
cline, however, it has been targeted as one major obstacle to rede-
velopment. 5 Urban planners and municipalities lack the funds
which would be required to clean industrial sites themselves in or-
der to attract business. 6 Even if such funds were available, how-
ever, urban leaders could not guarantee exemption from future lia-
bility to either buyers or sellers, because Superfund liability is
89. See Biblow, supra note 82, at 17; Byrne & Greco, supra note 17, at 17; Daley, supra
note 59, at A15; Hector, supra note 50, at 107; Schneider, supra note 54, at A12.
90. Pete Millard, Land Ho: An Environmentally Friendly Bill Discovers New Eco-
nomic Horizons, CORP. REP. Wis., Sept. 1993, at 23.
91. Martin, supra note 4, at 20; Neil R. Pierce, Time to Recycle Old Industrial
America, NATION'S CrrIEs WKLY., Aug. 23, 1993, at 10; Turner J. Smith, Thoughts on In-
vesting In Contaminated Property-Can Market Driven Remediation Help?, 1989 A.B.A.
REAL PROP. L. REP. 1 (1989).
92. See James Boyd et al., Resources for the Future, The Impact of Uncertain Environ-
mental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development: Developing a Framework for Anal-
ysis 8 (Jan. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Buffalo Law Review); NYS
HEARING REPORT, supra note 30, at 37 (suggesting that New York Department of Environ-
mental Conservation's remedial programs have been a barrier to economic development).
93. See Peter R. Pitegoff, Buffalo Change and Community: A Symposium, 39 BUFF. L.
REV. 313, 314-15 (1991); DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, NEW YORK STATE DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, BETHLEHEM STEEL IMPACT STUDY (1988).
94. Gordon Lafer, The Politics of Job Training: Urban Poverty and the False Promise
of JTPA, 22 POL. & Soc'Y 349, 351 (1994).
95. See Daley, supra note 59, at A15; Schneider, supra note 54, at A12.
96. See Lafer, supra note 94, at 359 (explaining that the share of money from the fed-
eral government to local governments has decreased by approximately one-fourth during the
1980s).
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imposed at a federal level.9 7
Often, owners who know toxins exist on their land but who
have not been ordered to clean up under Superfund, will let their
property sit, because "remediation costs substantially exceed prop-
erty value."98 These properties create not only an unaesthetic view,
they also create health risks to adjacent communities. Surprisingly,
sites which have been cleaned are often left fenced off and un-
used.9" Current owners tend to be reluctant to sell cleaned sites for
fear that use may aggravate previously unfound contamination and
expose them to additional liability.100
Many former industrial sites are located in "low-income and
minority communities.'' e* As a result of the difficulty of redevelop-
ing urban industrial sites, rejuvenation of economies in these areas
through large scale job creation or community development strate-
gies is severely inhibited.10 2 The fear of health risks from living on
or near property once labelled contaminated, and the lack of jobs
or industry has caused property values of inner city residences to
decline rapidly.103 Without a positive return on a sale of property,
prospects for moving to areas where new industrial jobs are availa-
ble (mostly suburbs and areas outside of the suburbs) is too costly
for many residents.
The future implications for cities is bleak as a result of the
strange cycle created by Superfund liability.10 4 Though urban in-
dustrial property may be less expensive than other development
property, the full cost is actually prohibitive. 05 In determining ac-
97. Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11; INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUNDTABLE, supra note 12;
CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12.
98. Boyd et al., supra note 92; Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11.
99. Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1.
100. Id.
101. Urban Superfund Sites to be Targeted First, SUPERFUND WK., Aug. 6, 1993, at 30
(quoting EPA Administrator, Carol Browner); Striking A Deal, NAT. L. J., Feb. 14, 1994, at
16 ("The Clinton Administration has aimed to strike a reasonable compromise in offering a
plan for Superfund overhaul that would deal for the first time with the plight of minority
and poor communities living near abandoned toxic waste sites.").
102. Urban Superfund Sites to be Targeted First, supra note 101.
103. John Mangels, Cities Sowing Seeds of Help in Brownfields, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, July 19, 1993, at 8A.
104. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12; Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform
of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 149 (1991); O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 48.
105. Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11, at 20:
Jobs and tax revenue will continue to drain from the cities because the potential
environmental cleanup costs make urban industrial property outrageously expen-
sive .... Who, after all, will build a factory on industrial property in Gary, Ind.,
or Bridgeport when the per-acre price, including remediation costs, is higher than
an acre in midtown Manhattan?
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tual cost to a purchaser, both cleanup costs and the cost of poten-
tial future liability must be added to the purchase price.
Previously cleaned property can become a liability for two pri-
mary reasons. First, subsequent to cleanup, the cleanup standards
may become more strict, thereby changing the status of the clean
property to that of contaminated property. Second, there is always
a risk that the initial environmental audit did not uncover all of
the contamination on the property, and if additional contamina-
tion is discovered, owners may incur liability. The uncertainty of
the costs often makes these sites less desirable to developers and
lenders. 08 As more urban industrial and commercial properties fall
into this category, the number of jobs and industries in cities will
continue to decrease.107
Current environmental laws are linked directly with econom-
ics. Superfund has had an impact on industry and economics, be-
cause it has affected decisions of business owners, developers, lend-
ers, insurers, and urban populations. "[P]roducts produced under
substandard environmental laws or weak enforcement regimes are
traded freely on international markets at a competitive cost advan-
tage over products from nations with strong environmental
laws." 108 Reform policies should not weaken our environmental
laws but, rather, recognize that a link exists between environmen-
tal laws and economics. Recognition will allow us to use that link
advantageously through the development of proactive policy to
countervail the negative economic impact of our environmental
laws.
Id.
106. Not only are the properties unlikely to be accepted as collateral by creditors be-
cause they have diminished values, but often creditors will refuse to get involved because
the properties can actually become liabilities. As noted supra notes 72-78, lenders may be
held liable for the cost of cleanup of contaminated property if they "participate[d] in the
facility's management prior to foreclosure." Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
1994). To best illustrate the unlikelihood of lenders willing to give credit for potentially
contaminated property,
Intervenor American Bankers Association points to survey data indicating that
lenders curtailed loans made to certain classes of borrowers or secured by some
types of properties in order to avoid the virtually unlimited liability risk associ-
ated with collateral property that may be contaminated. Some lenders . . . chose
to abandon collateral properties rather than foreclosing on them for fear of post-
foreclosure liability.
Id. at 1103.
107. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 55.
108. Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Trade and the Environment: Making
Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: Forging Competitive Sus-
tainability, 23 ENm. L. 545, 552 (1992).
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Superfund was enacted in order to address the problem of
hazardous wastes in the environment and to enforce the cleanup of
such waste.109 The reality is that Superfund has not led to this re-
sult, because Superfund encourages businesses to avoid liability
rather than take steps to clean up the waste. Many environmental-
ist supporters of Superfund believe that CERCLA and its associ-
ated liability scheme provides a good incentive for industries to get
out of the hazardous waste or chemical production industry alto-
gether.110 While that argument may be true, it is irrelevant with
respect to prospective purchasers or new owners of contaminated
land who have never handled hazardous waste. It is essential, in
evaluating the environmental effects of CERCLA legislation, to
look beyond its effect on the hazardous waste industry, and to look
at its environmental effects on the nation as a whole.
The strict liability component of Superfund is a barrier to
small businesses and industries to recycle urban industrial land."'
Because industries and small business owners often move to land
without previous industrialization, concern is currently being
voiced by environmental proponents and governmental officials
about the negative environmental impact of "greenfield" develop-
ment.1 2 Disincentives under Superfund for reuse of industrial land
encourage "sprawl onto unpolluted land," and "potential degrada-
tion of relatively pristine lands."" 3 Furthermore, concern has been
voiced by governmental officials about expanding existing infra-
structures to support the enormous growth of development to out-
lying areas."' Infrastructures already exist in urban areas and are
often not used to their full potential due to the migration of indus-
109. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1992); H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1985).
110. Administration of the Federal Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and Trans-
portation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1991) (statement of Douglas W. Wolf, senior project
attorney, National Resources Defense Council).
111. Clinton Proposal, supra note 12; CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12,
at 6; Martin, supra note 4; Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11.
112. See CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12; INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUND-
TABLE, supra note 12.
113. Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1; see
Mank, supra note 13, at 240.
114. Prioritizing Erie County Hazardous Waste Sites for Remediation Based on Future
Use Potential (Dec. 1992) (on file with Erie County Division of Environmental Compliance
Services); Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11; CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note
12. Infrastructures include sewer systems, roads, water and electrical systems.
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try and populations to greenfields. 115
In addition to promoting reduction of pristine wilderness land
and inefficient use of existing infrastructure, Superfund indirectly
encourages greater levels of air and water pollution by requiring
workers to travel greater distances to and from work.116 Though
deemed "environmental" for its originally intended purpose of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites, we must ask whether Superfund
legislation has, and will continue to have, a negative impact on the
environment in the future. In assessing the impact of the legisla-
tion from a holistic perspective, the answer appears to be "yes."
V. THE CALL FOR CHANGE
The current version of the Superfund law officially expired on
September 30, 1994.111 The taxes which are collected from the
chemical industry to finance the "Superfund" were authorized only
through December 31, 1995.118 The lengthy amendment to CER-
CLA, introduced to the House of Representatives on February 3,
1994, failed to make it through Congress by October of the same
year. 119 The current version of the law will continue to remain ef-
fective until such time as an acceptable amendment is proposed.
120
Various commentators, scholars, environmentalists, and busi-
ness leaders have criticized Superfund for its negative impact on
urban development, despite its well-intended goal of keeping land
safe and free from toxin exposure.121 The widespread call that
115. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 47:
Highway access, well developed infrastructure, power and water lines, easy access
to rail tracks and to other modes of transport are all desirable features of existing
city sites. In past decades, these features encouraged the active recycling of older,
abandoned business sites. The sites and the buildings remain, but the recycling
has stopped. Manufacturing jobs have not stayed in the inner city.
Id.; see also Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1.
116. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 47.
117. 26 U.S.C. §§ 59(A)(e)(1), 4611(e)(1), 4661(c), 4662(c)(1) (1988); see also Urban
Superfund Sites to be Targeted First, supra note 101; Mank, supra note 13, at 245; Clean
Up Extended for Three Years, Tax Authority for Four Years in Budget Bill, ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 27, at 1243 (Nov. 2, 1990).
118. 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A(e)(1), 4611(e)(1), 4661(c), 4662(c)(1) (1988); Urban Superfund
Sites to be Targeted First, supra note 101; Clean Up Extended for Three Years, Tax Au-
thority for Four Years in Budget Bill, supra note 117.
119. H.R. 3800, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
120. Telephone interview with Elizabeth Collaton, Northeast-Midwest Institute, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jan. 13, 1995).
121. EPA's Administration of Superfund: Hearings to Review the Administration of
Superfund by the EPA Before the Oversight Subcomm. of the Comm. on House Ways and
Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony of Robert M. Sussman, Deputy Administra-
tor of the EPA, agreeing with Rep. Amory Houghton (R-N.Y.) that Superfund legislation
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change in the current law is needed can be evidenced by the num-
ber of innovative bills introduced at the federal and state level. 122
On July 26, 1993, in a hearing of the House Ways and Means
Committee on the Administration of Superfund Sites by the EPA,
Robert Sussman, the deputy administrator of the EPA, reported
that one of the major "adverse impacts of the Superfund program
is to inhibit the development and redevelopment of property that
is part of the Superfund site or is contaminated."' 123 The EPA Ad-
ministrator, Carol Browner, also conceded that land use planning
needs to be considered under reauthorization, and noted that
[b]ecause urban hazardous waste sites take so long to clean up and are hard
to sell, development is occurring primarily in clean areas. One reason that
Superfund sites are undesirable for reuse is that under Superfund's liability
scheme, future owners could be liable for any future discoveries of
contamination.12
Superfund's liability scheme should be amended in order to
create incentives for industry to clean and redevelop industrial
land. 2 5 Redevelopment of industrial sites would: (1) increase jobs
and the tax base in depressed urban areas; (2) decrease the level of
contamination in cities by promoting cleanup of current contami-
ought to "create greater incentives for investors to make investments in [contaminated]
sites.") [hereinafter Sussman]; Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation of Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-103, 154-73 (1993) (testimony of Jan Paul Acton of the Congres-
sional Budget Office claiming that the current incentive provided under Superfund legisla-
tion is to develop previously uncontaminated sites and that liability should be restricted for
parties willing to redevelop previously contaminated sites) [hereinafter Acton); CUYAHOGA
COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12; INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUNDTABLE, supra note 12; Mar-
tin, supra note 4.
122. For a sampling of the innovative legislation which has been introduced to try to
combat the problems of urban redevelopment of industrial sites, see H.R. 1005, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (Urban Environmental Initiative Act); H.R. 2340, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (Environmental Remediation Tax Credit); H.R. 3843, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment Act) (H.R. 3843, introduced by Peter Visclosky
(D-I.N.) was incorporated in its entirety into the now defeated Superfund Amendment Pro-
posal, H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)); S. 972, Pa. 178th Gen. Assembly, Regular
Sess. (1993) (Industrial Land Recycling Act); H. R. 1895, Pa. 176th Gen. Assembly, Regular
Sess. (1993) (voluntary cleanup of abandoned industrial sites for innocent prospective pur-
chasers); H.R. 1299, Colo. 59th Gen. Assembly, 2d Regular Sess. (1994) (enacted, Voluntary
Cleanup and Redevelopment Act); S. 462, Wis. 91st Leg., Regular Sess. (1993) (Land Re-
cycling Act); S. 659, Mich. 87th Leg., Regular Sess. (1993); S. 720, Mich. 87th Leg., Regular
Sess. (1993); H.R. 4770, Mich. 87th Leg., Regular Sess. (1993); Minn. Stat. § 115B.175
(1993); S. 1036, N.J. 205th Leg., 2d Regular Sess. (1993) (enacted).
123. Sussman, supra note 121.
124. Urban Superfund Sites to be Targeted First, supra note 101.
125. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PLAN. COMM'N, supra note 12; Clinton Proposal, supra note 12;
INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUNDTABLE, supra note 12.
THE ROLE OF SUPERFUND
nation; and (3) discourage industry from developing pristine
lands.126 There is no indication that CERCLA was intended to dis-
suade potential purchasers from environmentally sound develop-
ment. A change in the law to redress its adverse economic impact
by providing redevelopment incentives would not contradict the
original intentions of the legislation.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
There are a number of reform measures which would help to
combat urban industrial decay and create incentives for industry
to rejuvenate economically depressed cities, create jobs in urban
areas, and preserve pristine lands. Many such measures have been
proposed at the federal level, others are being taken on by state
legislatures, and some have been formulated by private organiza-
tions. This discussion in no way purports to address all of the ex-
isting discourse on brownfield redevelopment, but rather touches
upon the major themes and trends of current policy proposals. Not
all proposals provide sufficient environmental and health protec-
tions for urban communities and not all proposals will effectively
promote positive community development. Many existing propos-
als should be comprehensively examined in order to determine
both their positive and negative effects on redevelopment of de-
pressed urban areas.
Proposed solutions and strategies for cleanup and redevelop-
ment of brownfields must be evaluated with respect to the original
purposes of Superfund legislation: to protect public health and en-
vironment 127 and to invoke strict, joint, and several liability on the
parties "responsible" for contaminating our land and water.12 A
brownfield redevelopment strategy should aim to (1) provide jobs
and an increased tax base for depressed urban areas; (2) ensure
long-term environmental monitoring of formerly hazardous sites;
and (3) remove some of the enormous financial risks associated
with acquiring contaminated lands. No one strategy will alleviate
the brownfields problem, and any effective solution must incorpo-
rate a number of the components discussed below.
126. Urban Superfund Sites to be Targeted First, supra note 101; Millard, supra note
90, at 23 (Linda Bochert of Wisconsin Legislative Council Committee); Sussman, supra note
121.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1992); Exec. Order No. 12,580(4)(d)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. 2923
(1987).
128. H.R. REP. No. 253 (I1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985); Feldman, supra note 5, at
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A. Lowering Cleanup Standards-An Oft-Cited Strategy to
Further Redevelopment
Proposals which call for lowering cleanup standards for indus-
trial property have been repeatedly touted as a means to spark ec-
onomic growth in poor urban areas. 129 Cleanups which meet strict
environmental and safety standards are generally extremely expen-
sive. The cleanup standards imposed by the federal government
are criticized as requiring the land to be returned to an unreasona-
bly pristine condition as well as being far too costly.13 0 The federal
government could reduce some of the cost of cleanup by lowering
the standards for property which will be redeveloped for industrial
use. The federal Superfund reauthorization bill does allow land use
to be considered with respect to the cleanup remedy selected for
the property.''
An example of such an incentive scheme has been imple-
mented at the state level in Michigan. In 1990, Chrysler Corpora-
tion attempted to build a million dollar Jeep plant in a poor, aban-
doned section of Detroit.132 Because of the traces of gasoline and
metals found on the site, Chrysler learned that the cost of cleanup
would almost equal the cost of building the new plant. Michigan
worked out a compromise with Chrysler in which both the state
and the corporation contributed money to containment rather
than removal of the wastes. The new plant opened within two
years, providing over 3,000 jobs to the city.13 The state's decision
to allow Chrysler to complete a less stringent cleanup than is ordi-
narily required, at a great cost savings, in a depressed urban indus-
trial area was widely supported by Michigan businesses and gov-
129. Reath, supra note 11 (referring to a study conducted by the Center for the Study
of American Business at Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. stating that "[n]ew cleanup
standards [should be] flexible enough to account for tradeoffs between environmental goals
and other socially desirable projects"); Striking A Deal, supra note 101, at 16 ("[T]he Clin-
ton Administration proposal would allow less stringent cleanup standards at sites that will
be devoted to industrial use."); see Innovative Technologies, Voluntary Cleanups Pushed
by HWAC, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEM. NEWS, May 19, 1993 (emphasizing future land use
planning as a factor which should be considered with respect to remedy selection of indus-
trial sites); Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11 (advocating a number of alternatives to the
Superfund liability scheme including releasing from liability those parties seeking to rede-
velop sites, lowering cleanup standards for existing sites and curbing lender liability);
Tucker, supra note 45 ("People say you shouldn't talk about jobs vs. the environment, but
it really comes down to that." (quoting Kathy Milberg, director of the Southwest Detroit
Environmental Vision Project)).
130. Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1.
131. H.R. 3800, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
132. Schneider, supra note 54.
133. Id.
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ernment officials. 3
This scheme could prove extremely dangerous without strict
protections in place. Before allowing cleanup standards to be de-
termined by proposed land use, three specific points should be
carefully considered. First, zoning laws may change in a particular
area, so that an area currently zoned for commercial/industrial use
may be rezoned for residential use in the future. In such instances,
the property deed would have to reflect that cleanup was con-
ducted only in accordance with the commercial or industrial zoning
requirements. Further cleanup would then be required prior to
most proposed changes in use. Cleanup of property often requires
actual removal of the soil. The prospect of conducting full site
remediation after foundations and buildings have been constructed
on the property could be enormously costly. Prior to constructing
the initial industrial or commercial building, it may be a better use
of time and resources to conduct a full remediation, thereby free-
ing up the deed for any future sale or use of property.
Second, proponents of a brownfield redevelopment strategy
that advocates use-based cleanup standards should bear in mind
that additional remediation might never occur, regardless of a
change in use. A change in use might not take place for years or
even decades. Proper mechanisms for enforcement of deed restric-
tions cannot be guaranteed, due to human error, unpredictable
changes in government, and the common inefficiencies of bureau-
cracy. A change in use from industrial to residential, or to a school
or playground could have serious results if cleanup procedures are
not extremely protective from the outset."3 5
Finally, urban centers are generally zoned with a mixture of
commercial, industrial, and residential uses.136 In urban neighbor-
hoods, it is much more difficult to differentiate health standards,
because residential areas are often in close proximity to industrial
areas. Urban residents often live near local industry, and their chil-
dren may take shortcuts through industrial property on their way
to and from school. Potential for exposure to contamination is also
increased if urban residents spend their days working in industrial
134. Id.
135. This scenario is not so different than the series of events which led to Love Canal.
See supra note 23. The Love Canal situation resulted from a former toxic burial ground
becoming the site of a school playground, surrounded by a neighborhood. The industrial
property owners, when transferring the deed to the city, set forth strict instructions that the
property was not to be used for any such purpose, due to the nature of the chemicals buried.
As the years passed, the instructions and warnings were ignored, resulting in the ensuing
and catastrophic series of events. Id.
136. See Clinton Proposal, supra note 12.
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plants. 1 7 Though a proposal to lower cleanup for industrial prop-
erty use may seem logical, all proposals must carefully consider the
surrounding community and the actual exposure levels of the peo-
ple who both work in and live near industry. Proposals which sim-
ply call for differentiated standards based on designated use may
not provide adequate protection to current and potential residents
of urban industrial areas. The federal Superfund reauthorization
bill'38 anticipates some of the aforementioned problems and
thereby requires that a number of relevant factors be taken into
consideration prior to lowering cleanup standards based on land
use."'3 Factors which must be considered include "the potential for
economic redevelopment"'40 in the area, "the proximity of the con-
tamination to residences[] [and] sensitive populations . . . [J],,141
"land use history[,] . . . current land uses of . . . surrounding
properties [and] recent development patterns for the area
... ""142 These safeguards provide a good foundation and indicate
that the bill's drafters have considered the severe implications of
lowering cleanup standards based on land use. At this stage, how-
ever, it is difficult to assess how seriously the government would
consider such factors prior to authorizing diminished cleanup stan-
dards for urban industrial property.
The notion of lowering cleanup standards in order to promote
industrial development, hence providing jobs for urban residents,
raises a myriad of environmental justice issues. 43 Essentially, the
proposals advocate lowering health and safety standards in favor of
job security.4 Incentives to promote economic redevelopment and
environmental protection must not jeopardize the original purpose
and goals of the Superfund legislation: "to protect public health[,]
137. Id.
138. H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
139. Id. § 510(2)(A)(I)-(Vll).
140. Id. § 501(2)(A)(V).
141. Id. § 501(2)(A)(VI).
142. Id. § 501(2)(A)(II).
143. The environmental justice movement has predominantly challenged the policy of
allowing disproportionate environmental hazards to be placed in low income and minority
areas, thus increasing the risk of health hazards to those members of the community who
have the least political and economic power. See generally Clarice Gaylord & Geraldine W.
Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 771 (1994); Sa-
mara F. Swanston, Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate Impact: What Can We Do
About the Failure to Protect the Most Vulnerable?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 677, 577 (1994);
Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431,
435 (1994); Deehon Ferris, A Challenge to EPA, EPA J., Mar.-Apr., 1992, at 28.
144. Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 143, at 771 (discussing "the promise of economic
prosperity and tax revenues forcing ... communities [with] high unemployment, to choose
between economic security and environmental degradation").
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welfare [and] the environment."145
B. Liability Release
A common scheme at the state level to increase brownfield re-
development is to release commercial and industrial developers
from liability in exchange for a cleanup of contaminated industrial
land.146 Because the fear of liability is often cited as one of the
primary reasons for the stagnation of brownfield redevelopment, 147
liability releases at the federal level will naturally be an important
component of any brownfield redevelopment strategy.
1. Who Should Benefit From Limitations or Releases From
Liability? The determination of who should be eligible for liability
releases should be the result of careful analysis. If the releases are
widely available to all individuals willing to remediate a brown-
field, they could counteract the intended purpose of CERCLA's
strict liability formula. 4s The idea behind a brownfield redevelop-
ment strategy is not to offer liable industries an escape from pay-
ing for cleanup, but rather to help rejuvenate abandoned or stag-
nant industrial urban areas. 149 Developers and investors should be
broken down into three categories: (1) those who have some causal
link with contamination on a certain piece of property, (2) current
owners of property who acquired it subsequent to contamination,
and (3) prospective purchasers who have no previous connection
whatsoever with the land they are interested in developing.
If full liability releases are offered to developers falling into
the first category, the entire basis of the CERCLA liability scheme
would be counteracted. 150 A liability scheme might be considered
145. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1992); Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
146. Liability releases are most commonly seen in state "voluntary cleanup programs"
whereby a state will release a party from liability or limit the liability of a party if such
party is willing to proceed with redevelopment of a contaminated piece of property. Volun-
tary cleanup statutes vary greatly from state to state. Most provide some level of liability
release, covenant not to sue or no further action letter for parties undergoing cleanup. See,
e.g., INn. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9 (Burns 1993); Environmental Response Act, MICH. COMP.
LAws § 299.614a (1992); Minnesota Voluntary Response Action Plans, MINN. STAT.
§ 115B.175 (1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.285 (1991).
147. Bartsch & Munson, supra note 2, at 75; Conference of Mayors, supra note 10, at 3;
Laws, supra note 45.
148. See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
149. This notion is supported by the current Brownfield Redevelopment policy objec-
tives of the EPA. See Conference of Mayors, supra note 10; Laws, supra note 45.
150. Recall that the basis of a strict liability formula is to spread the risks to all those
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity. See supra notes 39, 42-43 and accompanying text.
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whereby polluters"' could be given a partial liability release or a
cap on liability in exchange for not abandoning a contaminated
site and engaging in remediation and redevelopment. 152 A
brownfields redevelopment strategy offering a limited liability re-
lease to PRPs would be most workable if it were offered only on
sites which are not on the National Priorities List or on a similar
state registry. By the time sites reach that stage, they are generally
considered to be substantially contaminated, and all viable parties
which contributed to the pollution will be expected to fund the
cleanup.15 3
It may be sensible, however, to provide liability releases to
"polluters" in order to encourage cleanup of sites which are less
contaminated than those on a registry. Without such encourage-
ment, mildly contaminated sites would be more likely to sit for
long periods of time, thereby creating a greater health risk to
nearby communities. If releases of liability are dependent upon
cleaning a site to a nationally recognized standard, and if the
owner continued to pay for the cleanup, then liability releases of-
fered to polluters of mildly contaminated properties would be an
effective component of a brownfield redevelopment strategy and
would pose no greater danger to surrounding communities than the
existing system already poses.
The parties which fall into categories two and three are very
similar because neither of them is responsible for the contaminated
condition of the property. Proposals which offer liability releases in
exchange for cleanup would certainly be most equitable if offered
to both current, non-responsible owners, as well as potential pur-
chasers of property. A liability release proposal targeting non-pol-
luters exclusively may be a preferable strategy, primarily because
it will be much less controversial, will do the least damage to the
existing CERCLA liability structure, and will raise the fewest
151. Again, the term "polluter" is not meant to conjure up images of "guilt" in this
context. Many of the parties who are responsible for property contamination were, at the
time they handled the waste, following all required laws for such handling. CERCLA does
not concern itself with proper versus improper handling, but simply whether there has been
a release.
152. See Rubinstein & Field, supra note 11, at 20 (explaining that many owners of
abandoned property would prefer to let their property sit than sell it because "remediation
costs substantially exceed property value").
153. Under CERCLA's language, four categories of individuals will be held accountable
for the cost of cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1992). Of the four, only the first, current own-
ers and operators, may truly have no connection whatsoever with the contamination on the
property. Though the statute does require even this class of individuals to pay for a cleanup,
the rationale for including members of this category, who may not have contributed to the
contamination, is inequitable and should be renounced. See supra notes 43-44 and accompa-
nying text.
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problems and questions about who will fund cleanups.
Programs would be simplest to administer if offered only to
potential purchasers. If a liability release program was available to
both potential purchasers and current owners, but only for con-
tamination pre-existing purchase of the property, difficult proof
problems would ensue. Current owners would have to prove that
the property was already contaminated when they purchased it,
and their use of the property since the time they have owned it has
not exacerbated the contamination or the health risks to the com-
munity. Liability releases granted to parties which have no previ-
ous connection with the property eliminate any need to prove non-
contribution and would ease the administrative burdens of a
program.
Liability releases alone may not prove to be enough of an in-
centive to encourage prospective purchasers to redevelop on
brownfields rather than greenfields. This is particularly true if pro-
spective purchasers will be required to pay for the full cost of
remediation. The federal government may still be able to recover
remediation costs from any responsible parties associated with the
site. If any money were recovered, a portion of it could be given to
the prospective purchaser as a reimbursement for remediation. Al-
ternatively, the right to recover may simply be granted directly to
a prospective purchaser. Under this scheme, administrative recov-
ery costs would be removed from the federal government, and the
prospective purchaser would have the right to keep the full
amount, if any, of a judgment.15 4
The question of who should be offered liability releases by the
federal government may depend on a number of factors. Liability
releases could be offered to parties responsible for pollution, as
long as the property is not scheduled for cleanup, and as long as
the party conducts a remediation on the property and pays for
such a remediation. Liability releases should be offered to owners
who have no connection to contamination as well as to potential
purchasers of brownfields. Parties in these categories should not
necessarily be required to pay for the full costs of remediation on
the properties, particularly if viable responsible parties can be
154. Under H.R. 3800, if the federal government contributes money or services to a
response action on land which has been acquired by a prospective purchaser, and the gov-
ernment has not recovered all of its response costs, it has the right to place a lien on the
property in order to ensure recovery at the time the property is sold. Such lien is not to
"exceed the increase in fair market value of the property attributable to the response action
at the time of a subsequent sale or other disposition of the property." H.R. 3800 § 403(b),
103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Therefore it may become complicated to offer the right to
recover to prospective purchasers, particularly if the federal government, or some other
party, has contributed to the cost of cleanup.
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found. Successful brownfield redevelopment strategies will need to
offer flexible options such as those explored above to enable rede-
velopment to occur in an equitable and effective manner.
2. Should Liability Releases be Contingent or Comprehen-
sive? The release of liability clause should not guarantee immunity
for any contamination caused or exacerbated by the future own-
ers.155 Liability releases may be offered as an incentive for redevel-
opment of brownfields, but offering a release for future contamina-
tion gives permission to developers to pollute. Any brownfields
redevelopment strategy which offers a liability release should be
careful to maintain liability for any future pollution which is the
result of action by a new owner.
Two great dangers to parties engaging in remediation of
brownfields are that (1) cleanup standards will become more strin-
gent subsequent to cleanup; and (2) previously undiscovered con-
tamination will emerge after cleanup. The extent of liability re-
leases must be determined with an awareness of these events. A
liability release must be structured so as to exempt parties from
the cost of additional remediation in the case of tightened stan-
dards or reemergence. If a party receiving a liability release were
required to pay the full cost of cleanup on the property, as well as
the full cost of additional remediation in the above two instances,
the release from liability would basically be hollow.
Liability releases will only spark economic redevelopment if
they exempt parties from the additional remediation costs associ-
ated with a more stringent cleanup standard or from an emergence
of previously undiscovered contamination. These are some of the
uncertain costs or potential costs that make redevelopment of
brownfields so undesirable in the first place. If environmental as-
155. The Environmental Response Act in Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 299.614a (3)
(1992), specifically addresses this issue. It reads:
(3) A covenant not to sue issued under this section shall address only past releases
or threats or release at a facility and shall expressly reserve the right of the state
to assert all other claims against the person who proposes to redevelop or reuse
the facility, including but not limited to, those claims arising from any of the
following:
(a) The release or threat of release of any hazardous substance resulting from
the redevelopment or reuse of the facility.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 115B.175 (1993) provides guidelines for restricting liability:
Subd. 7. Persons not protected from liability. The protection from liability pro-
vided by this section does not apply to:
(1) A person who aggravates or contributes to a release or threatened release that
was not remedied under an approved voluntary response action plan.
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sessments are conducted in accordance with a state or federal stan-
dard and cleanup passes muster with a state environmental
agency, parties should not be held liable for the cost of additional
cleanup which may be required later.
In order to maintain an exemption from liability, parties may
be required to refrain from interfering with state action to control
a new health risk on the property.156 State remedial action could
involve substantial disruption of the regular course of business of
an industry for a rather lengthy period of time. Parties benefiting
from liability exemptions would have to be willing to take the risk
that no further remediation will be required and will have to be
convinced that if such additional remedial action is required, that
the income potential of the property will more than equal the cost
of any potential disruption. The cost of additional remediation, if
not born by current property owners, would either have to be re-
covered from existing responsible parties 157 (other than those who
have been released of liability) or from taxpayers.
3. Federal Proposals. Jan Paul Acton of the Congressional
Budget Office suggested to the House Energy Committee's Sub-
committee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials that the
legislature should limit liability of successor owners and operators
156. Both Michigan and Minnesota statutes, as part of their voluntary cleanup pro-
grams, require as a condition of liability release, that parties refrain from interfering with
state action required to control additional releases of hazardous substances on their proper-
ties. MICH. Comp. LAws § 299.614a (1992) states:
(3) A covenant not to sue issued under this section shall address only past releases
or threats of release at a facility and shall expressly reserve the right of the state
to assert all other claims against the person who proposes to redevelop or reuse
the facility, including but not limited to those claims arising from any of the
following:
(c) Interference with, or failure to cooperate with the department, its contrac-
tors, or other persons conducting response activities approved by the department.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 115B.175 (1993) states in part:
Subd. 2. The commissioner may approve a voluntary response action plan.., if
the commissioner determines that...
(3) The owner of the property agrees to cooperate with the commissioner or other
persons acting at the direction of the commissioner in taking response actions nec-
essary to address remaining releases or threatened releases, and to avoid any ac-
tion that interferes with the response actions.
Id.
Additionally, the federal Superfund reauthorization bill also gives prospective pur-
chaser status (exemption from liability) to a purchaser who "provides full cooperation, assis-
tance, and facility access to persons authorized to conduct response actions at the facility
." H.R. 3800 § 605(9).
157. As listed in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1992).
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who "recycle" contaminated industrial sites.158 Capping liability or
eliminating liability altogether for an industry willing to develop
an industrial site would provide incentives to get the urban sites
redeveloped. By legislating liability limitations, Congress could de-
cide what uses would be in the public's best interest and then pro-
vide limited liability only for such uses.159 Public involvement and
community consensus would be the most equitable method by
which to determine whether a proposed use is in the public's best
interest.160 Local communities may consider factors such as the
level of cleanup planned for the property, the potential environ-
mental dangers imposed by the new use, and the number of quality
jobs created for local residents.
The EPA now supports federal legislative proposals which
limit the liability of a prospective purchaser who is willing to "co-
operate[] with efforts to cleanup the site, does not contribute to
the site's contamination, and exercises due care to ensure the ex-
isting contamination is not aggravated."'' A prima facie determi-
nation of whether a new owner has met the above conditions might
be participation in a voluntary cleanup program. Federal bill H.R.
3800 provides that the bona fide prospective purchasers of contam-
inated property will be exempt from federal liability under
Superfund.162 One way in which a prospective purchaser can be-
come a bona fide prospective purchaser under the program is to
participate in a qualified voluntary state remediation program.'63
158. Acton, supra note 121; Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress
Told, supra note 1.
159. Superfund Liability May Add to Urban Sprawl, Congress Told, supra note 1. The
notion of providing incentives based on beneficial property use parallels the component in
Rep. Mel Reynolds (D-Ill.) Environmental Remediation Tax Credit bill. See infra note 189.
160. Community participation and public involvement should play an extremely large
role in any of the proposed policy changes recommended in this comment. The community
role is crucial in order to determine whether the proposed use is truly beneficial to the
surrounding neighborhood residents. The 1994 Superfund reauthorization bill incorporated
a wide range of community involvement techniques, including the creation of Community
Working Groups and Technical Assistance Grants. H.R. 3800 §§ 101-02, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994). For a more detailed discussion on the important role of public participation in
connection with environmental policy, see Ferris, supra note 143; Gaylord & Twitty, supra
note 143; Torres, supra note 143.
161. Laws, supra note 45. Unfortunately, the EPA criteria include no limitations re-
garding the types of uses which would qualify a purchaser for a liability release.
162. H.R. 3800 § 403(6)(C).
163. Id. § 301(K)(2).
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C. State Voluntary Cleanup Programs
Both the 1994 Superfund Reform Bill" and the EPA's
Brownfield Redevelopment Project encourage states to develop
their own voluntary cleanup programs. 65 According to the bill,
state voluntary cleanup programs "significantly increase the pace
of response activities at contaminated sites"' 66 and "benefit the
public health, welfare, and the environment by returning contami-
nated sites to economically productive or other beneficial uses. 1' 67
Federal approval will be granted to programs which provide "op-
portunities for technical assistance,"'"" "adequate opportunities for
public participation in selecting response actions,"'6 9 "streamlined
procedures to ensure expeditious voluntary response actions,' 70
"adequate oversight . . . to ensure . . . protecti[on] of human
health and the environment,"' 7 ' "mechanisms for the approval of a
response plan"'17 2 and "certification . . . from the state [indicating
completion]."' 3 Under the existing version of the bill, qualified
state programs would receive funding as well as technical assis-
tance from the federal government. 174 Prospective purchasers who
successfully complete cleanups under approved state programs
would receive release of liability at the federal level.' 7 Offers of
funding and liability release by the federal government would help
to encourage states to conform their programs to meet, at a mini-
mum, the federal requirements. The federal government's poten-
tial ability to shape state programs should be used to ensure that
positive urban economic redevelopment begins to take place. 176
164. H.R. 3800.
165. Conference of Mayors, supra note 10; Laws, supra note 45; H.R. 3800, offers finan-
cial and technical assistance to states to establish and expand voluntary response programs.
166. H.R. 3800 § 301(a)(1).
167. Id. § 301(a)(2).
168. Id. § 301(c)(1).
169. Id. § 301(c)(2).
170. Id. § 301(c)(3).
171. Id. § 301(c)(4).
172. Id. § 301(c)(5).
173. Id. § 301(c)(6).
'174. Id. § 301.
175. Id. §§ 301 and 403.
176. There are numerous problems which could stem from poorly designed voluntary
cleanup programs. States which allow for varying degrees of cleanup and little public partic-
ipation could more easily use favoritism and politics to determine which plans are "benefi-
cial" and what standards of cleanup are required. Economically depressed communities typ-
ically have less political power and find it more difficult to assert their interests in the way
land is developed. The developers generally are not from economically depressed neighbor-
hoods and may have influence over municipal leaders. These factors make it essential that
programs are administered according to strict guidelines and with a significant amount of
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The term "voluntary cleanup program" is used widely. Volun-
tary cleanup programs currently exist in many states, 7 and nu-
merous others are in bill form178 or have recently been enacted by
state legislatures. Each of the programs, however, is very different
and should be analyzed carefully. A model voluntary cleanup must
ensure fairness, positive economic growth, and protection of public
health, welfare, and the environment. In addition to providing
state liability releases, voluntary cleanup programs will be most ef-
fective if they incorporate financial incentives to encourage rede-
velopment and cleanup of contaminated sites.17 e The most effective
voluntary cleanup programs will provide a combination of strate-
gies and offer packages on a continuum, depending on the status of
the individual requesting participation in the program. Polluters,
for instance, may be offered only a release of liability for remediat-
ing a site, whereby a prospective purchaser may get a federal grant,
local tax abatement, and a release from liability.
Liability releases at the state level are a fundamental require-
meaningful community participation.
177. One example of a voluntary cleanup statute is the Minnesota Voluntary Response
Action Plans, MINN. STAT. § 115B.175 (1992). The Minnesota bill has been on the books
since 1992 and is a model plan in many respects. It provides liability releases, but only to
parties who have no previous connection with the contamination on the property. It also
allows for liability releases to lenders who finance the parties undertaking the cleanup, Ad-
ditionally, releases run with the property and, therefore, go to any successor or assignee of
the property. Id. Additionally, Minnesota provides Contamination Cleanup Grants. Id,
§ 116J.551-.557. These grants are provided to development authorities who submit a devel-
opment plan to the state. Plans are approved based on numerous factors, including those
with the highest potential for increasing the tax base of local jurisdictions, those with the
highest social value to the community, those properties which pose the greatest threat to
health and safety of the community, and the probability that the site will be cleaned in the
reasonably near future. Id. § 116J.555 (1). The only obvious drawback to the Minnesota
voluntary cleanup program is that it authorizes plans which do not remove or remedy all
releases at the site. The remedy may be less than 100% if the proposed use will not jeopard-
ize health and safety, will not aggravate or contribute to further releases, and the owner
does not interfere with state response actions. Id. § 115B.17. This limitation may be good
for industry, but it is likely to create an unnecessary risk for people living or working near
the property.
178. See, e.g., Voluntary Environmental Cleanup Program, H.R. 221, Ohio 120th Gen.
Assembly, Regular Sess. (1994) (enacted); Voluntary Remediation Act of 1994, H.R. 7784,
N.Y. 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 972, Pa. 178th Gen. Assembly, Regular
Sess. (1993) (providing for recycling of existing industrial and commercial sites, defines lia-
bility, sets standards of cleanup, establishing Voluntary Cleanup Loan Fund and Industrial
Land Recycling Fund); H.R. 1895, Pa. 176th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1993) (specifi-
cally aimed toward cleanup of abandoned industrial sites by prospective purchasers); Vol-
untary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act, H.R. 1299, Colo. 59th Gen. Assembly, 2d Regular
Sess. (1994) (enacted); Land Recycling Act, S. 462, Wis. 91st Leg., Regular Sess. (1993)
(enacted).
179. See discussion of financial incentives infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
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ment of any program in order to provide an incentive for purchas-
ers to undertake cleanup.18 0 Cash incentives, including grants or
tax credits,181 would help to ensure that not only wealthy develop-
ers, but all those interested in business development, could take
advantage of the program. Local tax incentives, such as tax incre-
ment financing, could also take some of the initial burden from
prospective purchasers. Remediation should be monitored by the
state to assure that those benefiting from participation are meeting
all environmental requirements.
Finally, community participation is an essential component in
any voluntary cleanup program. The community participation ele-
ment becomes more important as public funding is offered to de-
velopers. Community participation assures that public funds are
not spent on socially undesirable projects. The proposed new land
use should be part of any application for approval under a volun-
tary cleanup program. The community in which the site is located
should have a significant voice in determining whether a proposed
use would, in fact, be beneficial rather than detrimental to the lo-
cality. Unfortunately, state voluntary cleanup programs may qual-
ify for federal approval under the bill, even absent provisions man-
dating significant community participation components and
beneficial land use requirements for brownfields.
D. Financial Incentives
As noted in the previous section, liability releases alone may
not prove inviting enough to entice prospective purchasers to en-
gage in brownfield redevelopment. The cost of conducting remedia-
tion still may make the property more expensive than the cost of
redeveloping on a greenfield. In order to best spark redevelopment,
especially by prospective purchasers who currently run no liability
risk, financial incentives should be offered to prospective purchas-
ers in some instances. Brownfield redevelopment strategies need to
include economic components aimed specifically at developers will-
ing to provide long term economic benefits to particularly de-
pressed urban communities. Future land use should absolutely be
taken into account in order to prioritize the designation of funds to
developers interested in rebuilding impoverished areas.18 2 Land use
180. H.R. 3800, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), provides the necessary step of guarantee-
ing a federal liability release to participants in qualified state voluntary programs. The fed-
eral release gives more backing to the state release, and clearly gives more protection to the
participant.
181. See discussion of financial incentives infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
182. Minnesota provides grants to development agencies wishing to clean up contami-
nated sites. MINN. STAT. § 116J.555(1) (1992). Prioritization for designation of these funds is
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should be considered to the extent that the proposed use of the
land after cleanup provides economic growth potential for the area
and does not exacerbate the previous contamination problem. 183
Economic incentives for redevelopment can come in many forms
including tax credits, tax abatement, revolving loan funds at the
federal, state and local levels, and direct cash grants. One of the
most innovative financial incentive schemes aimed at brownfield
redevelopment has been proposed in the area of federal tax credits.
1. Federal Tax Credits. The idea of using the Internal Reve-
nue Code as an incentive for industry to conduct its business in an
environmentally conscious manner is not new. The late Senator
Heinz, in the original congressional hearings on the passage of
CERCLA, introduced a measure to amend section 103 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.18 4 The result of such a measure would have pro-
vided tax-exempt financing to industry for the installation of pol-
lution control measures and facilities.185 Though the measure was
not passed in the 1980 Superfund debates, there is great potential
for using tax credit incentives creatively in the field of environ-
mental protection.
A tax credit program which creates incentives for private in-
dustry to invest in socially responsible ventures in economically
needy areas exists in section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code: Low
Income Housing Tax Credits. 8 ' Section 42 is a means for the gov-
ernment to encourage the private sector to invest in low-income
housing. The tax credit incentive requires private investors to self
regulate for fifteen years or else risk losing the credits.18 7
given to development plans based on "[the] highest potential for increasing the tax base of
local jurisdictions relative to the fiscal needs of the jurisdictions as a result of developments
that will occur because of completion of the response action," and "the social value to the
community of the cleanup and redevelopment." Id. §§ 116J.555(2)-(3).
183. Id. § 116J.555.
184. 126 CONG. REc. S14,984-88 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980); see also Grad, supra note 4.
185. Grad, supra note 4.
186. I.R.C. § 42 (1994).
187. I.R.C. § 42(i)(1). Private industries invest a certain amount of money in low in-
come housing development. Generally, private, non-profit agencies oversee the housing de-
velopment and management. The investors receive a certain amount of federal tax credits
for every dollar they invest in the project. The credits yield an annual rate of return and are
granted over the next fifteen years. The credits are conditioned on the housing maintaining
a certain percentage of low-income occupants over the course of the next fifteen years. In
this way, the private industry cannot reap the reward of governmental incentives without
providing a lasting program of economic benefit to a community. The private industry will
assure that monitoring and oversight of the project is conducted properly and that the pro-
ject continues to survive as required, because they will not want to lose their investment.
The credits can be lost retroactively if the program goes out of compliance. Id. The fact that
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A similar incentive scheme as that provided under section 42
of the Internal Revenue Code could be implemented for economic
development of brownfields in depressed urban areas. In the sum-
mer of 1993, Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago testified before
Congress on proposed legislation to clean up abandoned industrial
sites.188 The proposed legislation, introduced by Representative
Mel Reynolds (D-Ill.), incorporates federal tax credits with other
local governmental incentives to entice industry to acquire and de-
velop "abandoned, contaminated industrial sites."' 8
Under Reynolds' bill, the environmental remediation tax
credit would equal twenty-five percent of the cost incurred by the
taxpayer for environmental remediation. The requirements for eli-
gibility are that the property be considered a "qualified contami-
nated site" and that the "remediation plan ... was approved by
the [EPA]."'190 No credits are granted until the EPA determines
that the cleanup has been completed.'' The credit would not be
available to any party who was the owner or operator of a business
on the site prior to the enactment of the legislation, to anyone who
arranged for the disposal, treatment, or transportation of hazard-
ous waste on the site, or to anyone related to the aforementioned
parties. 92
In order to be qualified, a site would have to be located within
a designated city. Under the bill, cities will be designated by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Cities will
apply for qualification under the program and contribute non-fed-
eral funding to the remediation of sites in their jurisdiction. 9 3
Non-federal funding can include "grants, loans, property or income
tax abatement, contributions by private parties or non-federal gov-
ernmental sources, or any other direct or indirect financial
assistance."'194
Cities will be chosen to participate in the program based upon,
among other factors, the "degree of economic deterioration . . as
measured by the city's manufacturing job losses between 1970 and
1990."'' 1 Criteria required for site selection include the unlikeli-
oversight of the projects is done by the private rather than the public sector, may save the
government substantial money over public housing ventures.
188. Daley, supra note 59.
189. H.R. 2340, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (The Environmental Remediation Tax
Credit bill introduced June 8, 1993 by Mel Reynolds (D-Ill.)).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 54(B).
192. Id. § 54(D).
193. Id. § 54A(a)(2).
194. Id. § 54A(a)(2)(B)(Ill).
195. Id. § 54A(a)(3)(A).
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hood that the site will be redeveloped without the credit and the
strong likelihood that redevelopment will result in job creation and
an increased tax base.196 Only sites which have been out of produc-
tive use for at least one year will be eligible for participation in the
program.197 This final criterion will help to assure that private de-
velopers will not receive money for projects which they would have
undertaken with or without the credit.
Representative Reynolds effectively incorporated socially re-
sponsible land use into the bill by authorizing credits only to those
uses which will bring economic benefits to the community. The bill
should be taken seriously and should be commended for incorpo-
rating environmental protection and urban revitalization into one
incentive scheme.
In general, eligibility for environmental remediation tax cred-
its could be based upon a number of factors including full environ-
mental remediation, location in a depressed economic area, and the
creation of a certain number of jobs to local residents. The initial
credits could be granted after the site passed agreed upon environ-
mental tests. Further credits could be authorized annually based
upon full compliance. Conditions for compliance should include
state of the art waste disposal and emission controls, maintaining
full operation of the plant, industry, or business for a certain num-
ber of years, and guaranteeing the continued employment of a
minimum number of individuals from the local community.
One of the major benefits of this type of scheme would be the
long range compliance requirements. With respect to both urban
redevelopment and environmental safety, long range commitments
are essential for any effective change. The other benefit would be
that the federal government would not be required to pay for the
cleanup initially. The cleanup would be funded by developers in
exchange for receiving tax credits as reimbursement in later years.
Reimbursement to the federal government for the amount spent
on the credits could be obtained by suing the parties responsible
for contaminating the land.
The tax credit scheme would have to be authorized under the
Internal Revenue Code, rather than under CERCLA. The only
change required under CERCLA would be to release from liability
those purchasers willing to undergo the cleanup and development
of the property. Including a tax credit scheme, such as the one laid
out by Reynolds, in any brownfields redevelopment strategy would
help to create needed incentives for prospective purchasers as well
196. Id. §§ 54A(a)(4)(A), (C).
197. Id. § 54A(a)(4)(B).
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as ensure a socially beneficial component to the strategy.
2. EPA Redevelopment Grants. The EPA is currently em-
barking on a Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Pilot Pro-
gram.19 The program aims to provide cash assistance to eight de-
pressed urban areas in an attempt to entice new industry to these
distressed regions.'99 The EPA's pilot program is one of a number
of recent indicators that the EPA and the federal government are
finally recognizing Superfund's detrimental effects on economic de-
velopment. Current EPA policy supports brownfield redevelop-
ment strategies aimed at prospective purchasers willing to reuse
and redevelop contaminated urban land. The EPA does not sup-
port strategies which would provide a benefit to polluters or
PRPs. 200
3. Community Development Block Grants. One of the most
obvious sources of cash which could potentially be used for brown-
field redevelopment comes from an already existing federal pro-
gram aimed at rejuvenating depressed communities. HUD's Com-
munity Development Block Grant (CDBG) program is authorized
primarily to assist in housing and small business development.20 '
The primary objective of the Community Development Block
Grant Program, authorized by the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act of 1974, is "the development of viable urban commu-
nities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living environ-
ment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for
persons of low and moderate income. '20 2
Government funding created for community development pur-
poses should be made available to both non-profit agencies and
members of the community who would otherwise be unable to start
businesses. Criteria for brownfield redevelopment funds under
198. Laws, supra note 45.
199. Id. The first of the eight cities chosen was Cleveland, Ohio. The purpose of the
cash ($200,000) paid by EPA to the city of Cleveland was to help locate the sites with the
most redevelopment potential. The cleanups will be conducted under Ohio's recently en-
acted Voluntary Cleanup Program. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 166.01, 166.07, 317.08, 2744.02,
2744.03, 3734.18, 3734.30, 3746.01-.07, 3746.071, 3746.08-.17, 3746.171, 3746.18-.31, 3746.35,
3746.99, 5709.82, 5709.83, 5709.87, 5709.88, 5709.881, 5709.882, 5709.883, 6111.036, 6123.01,
6123.032, 6123.041, 6123.14 (1994). Additionally, the EPA has given grants of $250,000 to
Richmond, Virginia, and Bridgeport, Connecticut in order to stimulate brownfields redevel-
opment and try to undo some of the harm created by Superfund. The money is not intended
to compensate any party which contributed to the pollution caused on the site and is aimed
toward bona fide potential purchasers of property. Conference of Mayors, supra note 10.
200. Conference of Mayors, supra note 10.
201. 24 C.F.R. § 570 et seq. (1994).
202. Id. § 570.2. (emphasis added).
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CDBG should be that all uses are economically beneficial to the
community, maintain strong economic recovery goals, and incorpo-
rate a meaningful community participation component. Without
community participation, the determination of a project's true eco-
nomic benefit to a community cannot accurately be measured.
A beneficial aspect to linking environmental assistance grants
to a needs-based agency such as HUD is that the funding can be
linked to a larger redevelopment scheme for the entire community.
CDBG funding is aimed toward assisting the neediest communities
in their development efforts.203 If the brownfields problem is a ma-
jor impediment to redevelopment, CDBG financing for site cleanup
in economically depressed areas should be an acceptable means to-
ward the goal of recovery.
E. Private Sector Redevelopment Strategies
A business angle on the issue of brownfield redevelopment has
been posed by a subsidiary of Southern Pacific Transportation
Corporation, an industrial group. According to Southern Pacific,
the EPA should reimburse non-liable parties on a quarterly basis
for taking the initiative to remediate sites in depressed economic
areas.204 The reimbursement would serve as a redevelopment in-
centive to entrepreneurs and assure that redevelopment is focused
in the neediest communities. 20 5
The proposal offers no assurances that the new use of the site
would in fact benefit the community. If tax dollars are to be given
to private individuals, some determination must be made about
which private parties will use them most efficiently. The proposal
also fails to include any liability release for either new or previous
owners of brownfields property. Without a community participa-
tion component and without some sort of assurance that long term
benefit would come from the remediation, the plan remains too
simple to be workable.
Richard Stroup, from the Political Economy Research Center
in Bozeman, Montana, has suggested that the government auction
off abandoned waste sites to bidders willing to clean up the prop-
erty and put it back in use.20 6 Under this creative solution, the gov-
203. Id.
204. Environment: Emissions Fee on Polluters Proposed as Alternative Superfund Li-
ability Scheme, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, REG. ECON. & L. (BNA) No. 195, at d19 (Oct.
12, 1993) (quoting John Spisak, President of Industrial Compliance, a Subsidiary of South-
ern Paciflo Transportation Corp.).
205. Id.
206. Richard L. Stroup, Privatizing "Orphan" Hazardous Waste Sites: A Way to Im-
prove Superfund, PERC VIEWPOINTs, Nov. 1992, at 4.
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ernment would pay the bidders to take the property. Bidders
would have to divulge their ultimate intended use of the property
as well as the type of remediation required to ready the site for
such use. The winning bidder would be the one requiring the
smallest payment. According to the research center, such an incen-
tive scheme would encourage companies to invest in research on
cost effective and reliable remediation methods.2 07
The beauty of this proposal, according to its author, is that it
gets the abandoned property back into the hands of private parties
as quickly as possible.20 8 The proposal suggests that the new owner
could post a bond with the government to use as collateral in case
the site was never cleaned.20 9 Stroup does not propose that a liabil-
ity release be granted, because he believes that the threat of liabil-
ity would help assure that the private party undertook a serious
cleanup effort.210 Stroup's proposal is novel, and it covers many as-
pects of the brownfields problem. Its main deficiency is its lack of
a community participation component which should be a necessary
part of any redevelopment scheme in which the federal govern-
ment offers cash to private parties for the purposes of promoting
redevelopment. The general public may prefer to have property sit
idle (and even contaminated) than to have their tax dollars used to
profit private individuals who have no obligation to benefit the
community.211
The above proposals all have incorporated some useful tools
for safely increasing economic development and environmental
cleanup in depressed industrial areas. Properly drafted alternative
policies should (1) provide financial incentives to non-responsible
parties only, (2) preserve strict liability causes of action by the
EPA against responsible parties in order to recoup some of the
cleanup costs, (3) ensure that liability releases to potential pur-
chasers protect against subsequently discovered contamination as
well as a change in the cleanup standards, (4) maintain cleanup
standards on commercial property which will consider the health
risks posed to adjacent neighborhoods and local residents, (5) as-
sure that a thorough cleanup is conducted prior to the granting of
liability releases, and (6) link local job development and long term
monitoring to any access to public funding. "Protection of public
207. Id.; see also Auctioning of Superfund Sites Suggested, SUPERFUND WK., Dec. 25,
1992, at 6.
208. Stroup, supra note 206, at 4.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See generally Ferris, supra note 143; Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 143; Swanston,
supra note 143; Torres, supra note 143.
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interest remains at the heart of deciding whether a ... settlement
under CERCLA should be upheld. '212 If protecting previously un-
contaminated lands from future toxin exposure and rejuvenating
the economies of urban industrial areas are considered to be in the
"public interest," then incorporation of carefully considered
brownfield redevelopment strategies should be well within the
bounds of the EPA administered Superfund policy.
CONCLUSION: LEGISLATING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The need to amend Superfund in order to induce economic
development of depressed urban areas has steadily transformed
from a somewhat extravagant idea to a common effort at the local,
state and federal level. The efforts and policy objectives of the cur-
rent administration are commendable and, with any luck, will help
to undo some of the economic and environmental hardship in our
cities.
The effects of redevelopment incentives will be both economi-
cally and environmentally beneficial. Safely redeveloping previ-
ously contaminated sites is essentially "recycling" of industrial
land. Superfund would not only have served its purpose in remov-
ing hazardous wastes from a community,213 but additionally would
encourage the land to be put back to productive use and allow the
community to continue to grow and thrive in a cleaner and safer
manner. A successful brownfields redevelopment strategy will focus
on extremely distressed areas and will heed the input of commu-
nity residents.
There is a direct link between environmental legislation and
economics. To legislate solely with regard to the environmental as-
pect is tantamount to pretending that environmental legislation
exists in a vacuum. Environmental laws can be used to effectively
"steer trade [industry] in a desirable direction" and to "encourage
economic activities that provide increasing levels of economic and
ecological well being."214 Unfortunately, environmental laws can
also be used ineffectively, without regard for future economic and
ecological well being. While it is beneficial that a clearer under-
standing of the link between environmental legislation and eco-
nomic development has emerged, it is unfortunate that it has
taken fifteen years since the initial passage of CERCLA for such
212. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (S.D. Ind.,
1982); see Feldman, supra note 5, at 315 n.104, 330 n.170; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)
(1992).
213. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
214. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 108, at 547, 551.
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widespread acceptance to arrive.
The history of this experience should serve as a lesson in our
future legislative policy. Legislation is generally passed to address
a current problem or grievance of the public. In this sense, legisla-
tion has historically been reactive. The problem with reactive legis-
lation, as illustrated by the examples of Superfund's effect on eco-
nomic decision making, is that it attempts to solve one problem
while creating a host of others. A move toward proactive legislation
is essential if we hope to avoid the unintended effects of hastily
passed legislation in the future. Forward reaching legislation will
be developed slowly and deliberately and will require extensive
public input, not only by politicians and special interest groups,
but by regular citizens, the ones most likely to be affected in the
long run.

